T wo major trends have converged in the health policy arena: a focus on improving access to health care, by expanding health insurance coverage, and ensuring that all patients receive a high quality of care. A major focus of quality improvement policies is a reduction in preventable adverse medical and surgical patient-safety events. Fifteen years after the Institute of Medicine's groundbreaking report "To Err is Human" was published, policymakers, providers, and patients have a continuing interest in improving the quality of care received in hospitals. 1 In 2010, the Office of the Inspector General estimated that, for Medicare alone, one in 4 patients experienced some sort of medical harm during a hospitalization (44% was most likely preventable, with a cost estimated at $4.4 billion). 2 The public interest in reducing patient harm has intensified, resulting in provisions of the Affordable Care Act that required the development of models for value-based purchasing and payment reform, along with the enhanced evaluation of care quality. 3, 4 Many private payers are following suit, by initiating their own payfor-performance initiatives. 5 Although earlier results have been mixed as to whether these payment reforms have been successful in changing provider behavior, [6] [7] [8] more recent data suggests that patient safety is increasing in hospitals. 9 The Affordable Care Act will expand insurance coverage to an estimated 30 million Americans, with one-half gaining coverage through the expansion of Medicaid. Numerous studies have shown that acquiring health insurance coverage improves health and well-being 10 ; however, the benefits of health insurance are not equal across all types of insurance. 11, 12 Disparities in hospital quality by payer status are well documented: Medicaid patients are less likely to be treated in adherence with process-of-care guidelines, 13, 14 face a higher risk of inpatient mortality for common medical conditions and surgical procedures, 15, 16 and are more likely to experience adverse safety events. 17 However, these findings reflect a mix of differences in the hospitals where patients obtain care, and differences in the care administered to patients within the same hospital. Several recent studies have attempted to distinguish these factors by controlling for the site of care, thereby isolating the "within-hospital" disparity between patient groups, defined by insurance 18 or race and ethnic status. 19 Recently, for example, the authors showed that mortality rates for certain conditions differed by patients' insurance status within the same hospitals. 20 In this paper, we examine disparities in adverse safety events within hospitals, using Patient Safety Indicators (PSI), which are developed by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality and which represent state-of-the-art measures of patient safety using administrative data. 21 The PSI represent events that result in patient harm caused by the medical system, which could be avoided through changes in the process of health care delivery. 22, 23 The PSI rates are riskadjusted to distinguish adverse outcomes that may be due to patients' underlying disease or condition, from processes of care that could be modified by providers. The policy relevance of the PSI is underscored by the fact that Medicare's hospital Value-Based Purchasing program now uses AHRQ's PSI to adjust payments to hospitals. 4 Using PSI rates calculated at the hospital-payer level, we explore the following questions in this study: Does the occurrence of adverse patient-safety events vary by insurance status within the same hospital? If yes, what are some possible explanations for these differences?
METHODS

Data
We pooled 2006-2008 discharge records at the hospital level from 11 states: Arizona, California, Florida, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin. These data were obtained from the AHRQ State Inpatient Discharge Database. 24 We selected these states because they are geographically diverse, report patients' primary payers, and collect all data elements that are required to compute the PSI. 23 These states contain 41% of the nation's population and are responsible for 38.4% of the nation's acute-care discharges.
We also used data on the average severity of inpatient admissions, measured at the hospital level, using a transferadjusted case-mix index provided by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). This project was reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Board of the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health.
Measuring Hospital Quality
We use AHRQ's PSI as our measure of hospital quality, which consist of adverse events related to medical and surgical discharges. 25 We used AHRQ's PSI software (version 4.3, provided in the statistical software package SAS) to compute ratios of observed (unadjusted) to expected event rates for each payer group within hospitals. Expected rates are computed by applying regression coefficients for risk-adjustment variables, which were estimated from a national sample of inpatient discharges, to the patient population for each hospital in our sample to which a particular PSI applies. This approach adjusts for a hospital's own distribution of ages, sexes, selected comorbidities, major diagnostic categories and DRGs, as well as the proportion of patients transferred to the hospital from another facility. The risk-adjusted rates were calculated using CMS's Present on Admission Indicators, which identify diagnoses that preexisted the hospitalization. The PSI software imputes these indicators in cases where they are missing from the discharge records. Consistent with the terminology used by AHRQ, we refer to the ratio of observed to expected rates as risk-adjusted rates. Following AHRQ's guidance, we computed risk-adjusted rates only if a hospital-payer group category had at least 30 discharges in the denominator during the period 2006-2008.
For each hospital in our sample, we computed separate risk-adjusted rates for 3 payer groups: private insurance, Medicare, and Medicaid. We identified payers using the primary expected payer variable in the State Inpatient Data. The risk-adjusted rates are aggregated to the hospital-payer level. Our analyses are, therefore, based on comparisons of up to 3 risk-adjusted rates per PSI, and per hospital.
Study Sample
There are 1601 nonfederally owned hospitals in our 11 states. We excluded the 167 specialty hospitals in these states because of their limited focus of treatment. This yielded a final sample of 1434 acute-care general hospitals that treat a broad range of conditions (Table 1 ). Of the hospitals in the sample, 71.5% are located in a Metropolitan Statistical Area, 23.3% are classified as urban safety-net hospitals, 7.7% are classified as rural safety-net hospitals, 22.6% are primarily minority serving (where at least 50% of discharges were for nonwhite patients), and 24.0% have Urgent Care Centers.
Because not all hospitals provided every service or had at least 30 discharges in the service for each payer category, we were not able to compute risk-adjusted rates for every possible hospital-payer combination. We used all available PSIs that applied, with sufficient frequency to each of the 5 main payer groups in our paper. For example, we did not analyze PSIs related to obstetric trauma during vaginal delivery, as virtually no Medicare discharges applied to these indicators. Across the 13 PSIs we considered, the number of feasible within-hospitalpayer comparisons ranged from 192 (Medicaid compared with private risk-adjusted rates for death among surgical procedures) to 1076 (Medicare compared with private risk-adjusted rates for accidental puncture or laceration). 
Statistical Analysis
We used regression analysis to compare within-hospital risk-adjusted rates from Medicare or Medicaid to private payers. The unit of analysis was a hospital-payer group dyad. The dependent variable was a risk-adjusted rate from a hospital-payer pair, for a particular PSI. The independent variable was an indicator for the public payer being compared with private insurance, which served as the reference category in each regression. Following recommendations from AHRQ, we excluded a pair of payers, from a particular hospital, from our analysis of a PSI if either payer had fewer than 30 cases applicable to that PSI.
We used ordinary least squares regression with robust standard errors, clustered at the hospital level, to estimate the association between payer groups and their risk-adjusted rates. The regressions estimated whether there were significant differences on a PSI between patients in other payer groups and their privately insured counterparts at a given hospital. For all models, we excluded outlying observations in the dependent variable, which we defined as rates that exceeded 3 SDs of the mean risk-adjusted rate within a PSI (across all payers).
We included the following hospital-level measures as control variables. First, we defined a hospital as minority serving if at least 50% of its discharges were for nonwhite patients. Second, we identified safety-net hospitals as those hospitals with a disproportionate share of Medicaid, self-pay, and uninsured patients, compared with other hospitals in the same market (defined as a Metropolitan Statistical Area or state). 26, 27 Third, we used the hospital's case mix index to control for the average patient severity. Lastly, we added state-fixed effects to control for state-level policies that may affect variation in hospital quality.
RESULTS
The characteristics of the approximately 35 million patient discharges used in the analysis are described in Table 2 . Medicare and Private Payers represent the predominant source of payment. Although there are observable differences in the patient characteristics across the 3 payer groups, including age, Major Diagnostic Categories, comorbidities, and point of origin, the risk-adjustment algorithm adjusts for these characteristics. 28 Table 3 shows the risk-adjusted rates by payer for each of the 13 PSIs. An observed to expected event ratio greater (less) than 1 indicates that a hospital performed worse (better) than the average hospital with an equivalent case mix. For example, in our sample of hospitals, pooled across all payers (not shown in table), we see a higher than expected rate for death in lowmortality DRGs (1.501) and a lower than expected rate for Postoperative Hip Fracture for adults not susceptible to falling (0.3921). Overall, Medicare and Medicaid experience worse hospital performance on most PSIs than private payers. Table 4 shows expected differences in the number of risk-adjusted patient safety events between payers. Results in the table are regression-adjusted differences in risk-adjusted patient-safety events, multiplied by the average patientsafety event rate for all hospitals and payers in our sample, for that PSI. The results can be interpreted as the average increase or decrease in the number of patient safety events, per 1000 discharges, experienced by patients in a particular payer group, compared with patients with private insurance. Statistical significance is determined using a P-value of 0.05. (However, we also report cases where the difference in riskadjusted rates between payers was significant at P < 0.01.) Medicare patients experience a significantly higher rate of adverse safety events than privately insured patients for 12 of the 13 PSI. Medicaid patients have significantly higher rates for 7 of the 13 indicators, but lower rates for 2 of the 13 indicators.
Lastly, we consider whether aspects of the health and frailty of Medicare patients that are not captured in the riskadjustment algorithm could explain our finding that Medicare patients experience poorer care on most PSI. To minimize the influence of potentially unobserved differences between private and Medicare patients, we reran our analysis on private patients aged 55-75 compared with Medicare patients aged 65-75. In this subgroup, we find very similar results, with 9 of the 13 indicators continuing to show significantly worse outcomes for Medicare patients (Table 5 ).
CONCLUSIONS
In our analysis of hospitals from 11 states, we found that, within the same hospital, the quality of care varied by patients' insurance status. This result suggests that differences in payment between public and private payers may result in inferior care. That is, privately insured patients may have fewer patient safety events because insurance pays more to hospitals, attending physicians, and surgeons than public payers. The Medicare Payment Advisory Committee reports that private insurers pay 20% higher rates on average than the Medicare program to physicians and 30% higher rates to hospitals. 29 In contrast, it is possible that unobserved factors associated with insurance status, which are not controlled for by risk-adjustment, increase publicly insured patients' risk of adverse events.
Both explanations may account for our findings. First, differences in care processes that lie outside of a hospital's control can affect performance on quality measures. For example, privately insured patients may be able to obtain better care coordination from attending physicians. Second, although our sensitivity analysis indicated that unobserved differences between patients did not materially bias our findings, it remains possible that the risk-adjustment algorithm omits important information about high-risk patients. In such cases, policies that adjust payments to hospitals based on performance on quality measures may unintentionally penalize facilities that treat high-risk patients. Third, coding of comorbidities present at the time of a hospital admission could vary by payer, based on different payment incentives that hospitals face. For example, we found that Medicare patients had the highest number of recorded comorbid conditions on each discharge record, on average, whereas privately insured patients had the fewest. Although this may indicate differences in the baseline health status of patients, other system-level factors may affect how diagnoses are reported, making it more difficult to distinguish differences in quality from differences in risk-adjustment. 30 To the extent that there are differences in the coding of comorbidities by payer, we may not be able to distinguish differences in risk-adjustment from differences in quality. Although the PSIs are important indicators of quality, they may not provide a complete picture of hospital performance. This calls attention to the Institute of Medicine's recommendation that paying hospitals for performance on specific quality measures should not come at the expense of efforts to improve quality on other, nonmeasured processes of care. 31 Caution should be used in adjusting payments to providers or insurers based on performance on specific quality measures.
In conclusion, we find that, within the same hospitals, Medicare and Medicaid patients have significantly higher risk-adjusted rates of adverse safety events on most of AHRQ's PSI. Recent reductions in the number of adverse safety events indicate that these events are amenable to intervention. In addition to policies designed to address overall rates of adverse events, policies to redress quality disparities across insurers should also be examined. Such policies could include payment reforms, provided that the payment model provides hospitals with sufficient resources to improve care for publicly insured patients, and that it properly adjusts payments for the clinical and social needs of the patients that a hospital serves. 32 In some cases, the level of payment alone may not be a sufficient instrument for quality improvement. Researchers and policymakers should investigate whether patterns of care, during and preceding a hospitalization, put patients at different levels of risk for adverse safety events. This can help to identify whether global payments, care coordination payments, or other financial incentives hold the potential for improving the management of hospital care for certain payers. Such reforms will require insurer, provider, and government collaboration to define and reach objectives for improving inpatient care quality for all patients. Providers should also explore differences in care process that may lead to differences in hospital outcomes for patients with different insurance. Research on processes of care that may explain the equality disparities we observe, and the effects of payment reforms on these quality disparities, is needed. 
